#Note that we are just enumarating here. We are not preforming exploitation. There is a linux equalivent called certipy that works much the same way# Find CAs C:Tools\Certify.execas# Find templatesC:Tools\Certify.exefind# Find vulnerable templatesC:Tools\Certify.exefind/vulnerable
Local host
Active Directory Certifcate Services or ADCS provide an alternative way to authenticate within a AD enviroment that contains a PKI as well as
being configured with a Certifcate Authority. References below will provide technical info on ADCS as well as exploitation techniques from
spectorops certfied preowned white paper.
The Defender module's Add-MpPreference cmdlet adds entries to the Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusion list so matching items are no longer scanned in real time or on schedule: -ExclusionPath excludes a folder/file, -ExclusionProcess excludes any files opened by a named process, and -ExclusionExtension excludes an entire file type. Any of the three carves a blind spot for staging and executing tooling.
Use Carve a Defender blind spot by excluding a staging path, an attacker process, or a whole extension before dropping tooling.
# List available DNS zonesadidnsdump-u'test.local\john'-ppassword123--print-zonesldap://10.10.10.1# Dump the default zone; -r resolves nodes hidden from the unauthenticated listing (records.csv)adidnsdump-u'test.local\john'-ppassword123-rldap://10.10.10.1
Active Directory
adidnsdump (dirkjanm) abuses the fact that any authenticated domain user can read the AD-integrated DNS zones (stored in the DomainDnsZones/ForestDnsZones partitions), effectively performing a zone transfer without being a DNS admin. Records whose node name is hidden from the anonymous listing are still enumerable and can be resolved by adding -r, which issues a live DNS query for each hidden node. This maps internal hostnames to IPs for target selection; results are written to records.csv. Use --print-zones first to see which zones exist.
Command Reference:
Username: john
Password: password123
Domain: test.local
Target DC IP: 10.10.10.1
Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).
Use Run local or remote script(let) code through INF file specification.
The file is displayed in the terminal interface. Other options might be available, for example, by pressing `S` is possible to save the file content elsewhere.
The ms-appinstaller:// URI is handled by the signed App Installer (AppInstaller.exe), which reaches out to the source URL, attempts to load/install the package, and caches the fetched file in INetCache. The download rides a trusted protocol handler with no obvious downloader on the command line; the same handler underpinned real-world MotW-bypass delivery campaigns.
Use Download a remote file/package through a trusted URI handler rather than an explicit HTTP client.
Launches a ClickOnce application via `Applaunch.exe`. Bypasses SmartScreen and default AppLocker rules when the application is published as partial trust.
Use Execute ClickOnce applications in environments where `dfsvc.exe` would normally enforce full-trust and SmartScreen checks. Can be abused as an AWL bypass in rare configurations.
A server instance must be already running, otherwise it can be started with `sudo asterisk -F`. Moreover, the invoking user must be able to access the socket.