IOC: wsb.exe command line containing --config with an embedded <LogonCommand> XML element
IOC: wsb.exe command line invoking the share subcommand with --allow-write
IOC: wsb.exe command line invoking the exec subcommand with -r System
IOC: WindowsSandboxServer.exe spawns whenever a Sandbox session starts, regardless of whether anyone connects. Lives under %ProgramFiles%\WindowsApps\MicrosoftWindows.WindowsSandbox_*\.
IOC: WindowsSandboxRemoteSession.exe spawns ONLY when an RDP connection to the Sandbox is established - opening a .wsb file directly auto-connects (so both processes appear), but `wsb start` alone does NOT spawn it. Its absence while WindowsSandboxServer.exe is alive means no user has connected.
IOC: (highest-signal for headless abuse) WindowsSandboxServer.exe present WITHOUT WindowsSandboxRemoteSession.exe indicates a Sandbox VM is running with no interactive session. Legitimate usage almost always involves an RDP connection (because users want to use the Sandbox); a server-without-remote-session state is consistent with the `wsb exec -r System` headless attack primitive.
IOC: vmwp.exe and vmmemWindowsSandbox spawned alongside wsb.exe activity indicate the Sandbox VM is up (vmwp is the Hyper-V worker hosting the Sandbox VM)
IOC: Host-side file-creation events on paths corresponding to a mapped folder, attributed to vmwp.exe (Hyper-V worker), with timestamps inside the lifetime of an active Sandbox session - empirically verified on Windows 11 24H2 via Process Monitor; this is how a sandbox-to-host cross-boundary write surfaces from host telemetry
IOC: Microsoft-Windows-Sandbox-Client-Diagnostics/Admin event log entries for Sandbox lifecycle events correlated with wsb.exe invocations